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Abstract 
 
The current study tests whether there was an empirical and positive relation 
between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books and the 
invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans were a vehicle adopted for 
“laundering” the proceeds of this accounting and tax fraud. 
The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of such a positive 
relation. It suggests that at least a part of those loans is related to accounting and tax 
fraud, and these loans are the vehicle for ”laundering” the proceeds of non recorded 
transactions and, simultaneously, keep the involved companies financially solvable. 
The current study makes four main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it 
brings a novel perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature, that is not 
the usual context related to imports and exports activities; secondly, it shows that in the 
particular context described in the paper shareholders loans are used as a way of 
“laundering” the proceeds of invoiceless sales, and to keep companies solvable;thirdly, 
it connects the earnings management literature to the literature on fraud, also a 
novelty; fourthly, based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies, the 
study also makes a contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely by 
bringing information about the way tax evasion evolves in this region.  
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1- Introduction 
In everyday lifeit may happen to Portuguese consumersto purchase a specific 
good or service and receive not from the seller the correspondent invoice. If the 
consumer requestsit the seller tends to adopt one out of two attitudes:he/shelooks the 
consumer with disfavor and issues the invoice; or tells the consumer that the issuance 
of the invoice implies tocharge him/herthe Value Added Tax (VAT). It is true that 
sometimes are consumers themselves that trigger invoicelesssales whenask the seller 
if it is possible notto invoicein order to avoid the VAT payment. This kind of behavior, 
either by consumers or by sellers, implies that a significant portion of goods and 
services traded in the economy is not invoiced. 
These sales are a part of the so called “informal economy”, that in Portugal 
represents around 23% of GDP (e.g. Afonso & Gonçalves, 2009; Anno, 2007). Among 
other consequences,invoiceless salesimply a significant decrease in tax collection, 
namely VAT and Corporate Income Tax (CIT). 
The dimension of the problem worries every government. This is apparent in the 
attitude of the Portuguese TaxAuthority(PTA) that for a long time kept in the media and 
on its official site on the internet an advertising campaign subject to the theme 
“Pleaseask the bill. The bill moves the country forward”, seeking to raise citizens’ 
awareness for the social importance of always requestingthe invoice. 
A report on the newspaperCorreio da Manhã, onthe 2ndof April 2005,mentioned 
the intention of the PTA to inspect the accounting booksof companies that potentially 
make a part of their business in the informal economy. The report added that “…one of 
the factors the PTA willbe paying more attentionis to the account of ‘shareholders 
loans’.1 It is through this mechanism that the company can sell in the ‘informal 
economy’ and survive financially. Shareholders loans are the vehicle to introduce the 
cash in the company". 
In fact, companies makinginvoicelesssaleshave their accounting 
earningsmanaged downward, and the income tax bill shrank. However, unless such 
companies are able to buy the inputs in the informal economy, and pay them with 
undeclared funds, invoicelesssales practice sooner or later will tend to lead the 
company into treasury management problems, and difficulties in honoring financial 
commitments. To prevent this constraint, the financial amounts collected 
frominvoicelesssales must be pumped into the company treasury. This can be done 
through shareholders financial loans,“laundering” the cash that was in the informal 
circuit and, at the same time, providing the funds that assure companies’ financial 
stability.2Most Portuguese people know, or at least knew, one or more concrete 
situations of this type. 
Under these circumstances, this paper aims to show whether there was an 
empirical connection between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ 
books and the invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans are a vehicle 
adopted for “laundering” the proceeds of this accounting and tax fraud. 
Two main factors motivate our study. Firstly, there is no evidence in the 
literature, at the national and international levels, shedding light on this type of fraud. 
The areas of fraudulent financial reporting and tax fraud “… have been somewhat 
                                                            
1For thesakeofsimplicity, throughoutthepaperwewilllabelthistypeofloans as “shareholdersloans”. 
However, for entitiesthat take a legal structureof “limitedliabilitypartnership” a more precise 
definitionwouldbe “partnersloans”.  
2Throughoutthepaperwewilllabelcorporateentities as “companies”, evenwhentheyhave a 
parnershipstructure.  
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neglected in the literature” (DeFond, 2010:406), although these types of 
phenomenaare costly for the society as a whole, a motive of strong inequality among 
citizens, and seems to be more widespread in the business world than one could 
expect. For DeFond(2010:406), “the relatively small number of papers that investigate 
[accounting] fraud may be due to difficulties in obtaining data on fraud other than those 
reported in AAER [Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases] …”. Thus, the 
current paper is a contribution to this almost empty research area, taking advantage of 
a particular economic, legal and social context that allows us to overcome some of the 
difficulties other researchersface when intend to enter the area of accounting and tax 
fraud. Moreover, this research goes beyond this already important contribution and 
sheds light on a particular way of achieving the “money laundering” ofinvoiceless 
salesproceeds. 
Secondly, as we explained above, there is a particular context, a temporary 
window of opportunity, thatmakes possible the design of the research in a way that 
avoids the access to privileged corporate information, or even to the mentioned AAER. 
Until2007,despite thePTA recurrent menaces, it was quite easy for Portuguese 
companies to introduce in their treasury the informal proceeds of invoiceless sales. 
They just needed to take these proceeds and record them in the books as 
shareholders loans. This implied thus that associated to increases in such loans one 
had a high probability of finding traces of invoiceless transactions. This is what we will 
be doing. It is a unique opportunity, namely because nowadays the legal and 
accounting mechanisms of control in place, namely more intense and regular audit 
inspections by the PTA when companies report increases in shareholders loans, and 
the bank system obligation to control the origin of all funds that enter a person or 
company account, even for small amounts, narrowed enormously companies window 
of opportunity for laundering the money related to the type of fraud activities we have 
mentioned. 
This paper intendsthus to make a contribution to the literature, and offer a better 
and structured understanding of this type of accounting and fiscal fraud, and also of its 
connection with the “money laundering” through shareholders loans. It grounds on the 
earnings management literature (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006), and extends it to take into 
account the extreme situation in which the operations are effective fraud, taking 
advantage of aparticular context whereanecdotal evidence shows the existence of the 
phenomenon.Moreover, our research also connects the earnings management 
literature to that of “money laundering” (e.g. Mitchell et al., 1998; Schneider & 
Windischbauer, 2008), making a contribution for a better understanding of phenomena 
that are usually treated in the literature as if they were independent. 
The study adopts a relatively simple three-step methodology. Firstly, two 
subsamples of firms are assembled, one composed of companies with shareholders 
loans increases; the other, the control sample (e.g. Moreira, 2006), of companies with 
loans decreases. Gathering these subsamples, the global sample is composed of pairs 
of firms belonging to the same industry and year, and having identical size, but 
differentiating in the sign of the change in shareholders loans. Secondly, as we justify 
in detail later in the paper, invoiceless sales leave traces in the accounting numbers, 
not only in the cash flow that affects the treasury but also in companies’ gross margin. 
Companies are classified according to their fraud behavior into groups of “fraudster” 
and “non fraudster”, basedon predictions of their abnormal cash flow from operations 
(CFO) and cost of goods sold (COGS) (e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006). 
Thirdly, a model is developed and regressed to test the relationship between 
companies’ fraud behavior underlying invoiceless sales and the sign of shareholders 
loans change. 
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The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of a positive relation 
between shareholders loans increasesand tax fraud through invoicelesssales. 
Theevidence suggests that at least a part of thoseloans is related to accounting and tax 
fraud, and these loans are the vehicle for “laundering” the proceeds of informal 
transactions and, simultaneously, keepthe involved companies financially solvable. 
The current study makes four main contributions. Firstly, it brings a novel 
perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature(e.g. DeFond, 2010), 
highlighting an economic and corporate context of under-invoicing sales, in the limit 
invoiceless sales, that is not the usual context related toimportsand exports activities 
and the attached use of transfer prices (e.g. Biswas & Marjit, 2005; Patnaik & 
Vasudevan, 2000). Secondly, it shows that in the particular context described in the 
paper shareholders loans are used as a way of “laundering” the proceedsof invoiceless 
sales, serving simultaneouslyto keep companies solvable. This double purpose of the 
“money laundering” vehicle is in itself also a novelty in the literature, contributing for a 
better understanding of what can be ineach moment and context the determinants 
underlying the choice of the vehicles adopted to reintroduce illicit money in the formal 
economy.Thirdly, adopting a design and research tools borrowed from the earnings 
management literature to study a fraud problem, the paper also brings a contribution by 
relating somewhat that literature to the one on fraud (e.g. DeFond, 2010). Fourthly, 
based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies,our study also makes a 
contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely by bringing information 
about the way tax evasion evolves in this region (e.g. Richardson, 2006). 
On a more practical perspective, this study is of particular interest for the PTA, 
because of the contribution it makes to a better understanding of Portuguese business 
reality and the relation between companies, buyers and that Authority. Moreover, it is 
also of interest for similar authorities in other countries that face similar challenges in 
copping with tax evasion and “money laundering”. 
The study contains five additional sections. Section 2 comprises a literature 
review on incentives to earnings management, accounting and tax fraud and “money 
laundering,and displays a brief characterization of the Portuguese economic and legal 
context. In section 3, the research hypothesis is developed and discussed. Section 4 
shows and justifies the methodology used. The empirical results are discussed in 
section 5, as well as those arising from robustness tests that have been carried out. 
Finally, a summary of the main conclusions and contributions is made available in 
section 6. 
 
2- Literature review: from earnings management and accounting fraud 
practicesto “money laundering” in the Portuguese context  
Healy and Wahlen(1999) defined earnings management asthe result of 
managers accounting choices in a way that generates a gain for themselves or for 
companies they work for. These choices are, at first, within the law and allowed by 
accounting standards flexibility. However, they can be of fraudulent nature, for example 
in the case of under-invoicing or of invoicelesssales, which go beyond the standards 
and the law. In the context of empirical studies, it isvery difficult, if not impossible, to 
distinguish the impact of legal from illegal actions. In the context of the currentstudy, as 
explained in the introduction, the specific time and context frame allows to define 
companies’ actions as fraudulent. However, even in this case, we are unable to assure 
that the adopted research design is not picking up also legal (earnings management) 
actions. Thus, we ground our research on the earnings management literature, and 
adopt for thisterm a broader scope that goes beyond managers’ mere use of 
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accounting standards flexibility (Ball, 2009).Beyond the illegality of fraud, empirically 
itsmain consequence is that it does not imply the “reversion of the earnings effects” as 
it tends to happen in legal earnings management actions.  
2.1- Incentives to undertake earnings managementand tax fraud 
2.1.1- Generic incentives 
The literature on the empirical study of opportunistic earnings management 
through accruals date back to Healy(1985). The incentives managers face to undertake 
such kind of action are diverse, and the following are the most commonly discussed: 
toaffect their bonuses (e.g. Guidry et al., 1999; Healy & Wahlen, 1999) or the 
company's debt agreements (e.g. Dechow et al., 1996; Sweeney, 1994); to circumvent 
the regulations (Jones, 1991); to meet capital markets expectations(e.g. Burgstahler & 
Eames, 2003; Cheng & Warfield, 2005).Thus, accounting choices underlying earnings 
management tend to be influenced by political, contractual and agency costs (e.g. Ball 
& Shivakumar, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
However, such incentives have been mainly studied for listed companies of 
Anglo-Saxon countries, thus avoiding a direct relation to the incentives faced by 
managers of unlisted companiesmanaged by their owners, where agency conflicts with 
shareholders have no place, and political costs tend to be nonexistent. 
The research focused on earnings management incentives ofunlisted 
companies operating in economic and institutional contexts of “continental”type is more 
recent. Such incentives have been studied, among others, byBurgstahler et al. (2006), 
Garrod et al.(2008)and Moreira (2006). Thesestudiesofferempiricalevidencethat the 
mainearnings managementincentives, in contextswhereaccounting and taxation are 
closelylinked, tend to bethe minimization of the incometax, and to obtainbankfinancing 
in good conditions.Although such literature do not explicitly discuss the fraud issue, it is 
apparent that the economic and business environment underlying the activity of this 
type of firms, and in most cases the absence of auditors that control the quality of their 
accounting information, permits one to see fraud as a upper level of earnings 
management actions (e.g. Young, 2004). Moreover, in the context of these firms, 
where the manager most times is the owner, it is easier to see some of the 
determinants of tax evasion discussed by Richardson(2006), like low education, or a 
low rate of tax compliance.  
 
2.1.2- Incentives to minimize the income tax  
The economic and institutional context surrounding companies seems to be a 
determinant of the nature of their earnings management incentives. For example, in a 
study for countries of the European Union (EU)Burgstahler et al. (2006)found that the 
existence of a strong link between accounting and tax rules is associated with greater 
downward earnings management in order to minimize income tax. In the same way 
Garrod et al. (2008)for a similar context.  
The Portuguese case does not seem to be different, and it is a fact that there is 
very close relation between accounting and taxation. However, companies tend not to 
avoid completely the payment of taxes. Instead, because the Tax Authority (PTA) 
audits companies disclosing losses, they pursue to disclose small positive earnings, 
minimizing the tax payment(Moreira, 2007), unless they adopt stronger actions deemed 
as fraud, like invoiceless sales. 
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The tax incentive, regardless the economic and institutional context,seems to 
have less impact on listed companies. Their professional management, 
andsophisticated tax planning strategies,instead ofdownward earnings management, 
are deemed as the main justifications for such a lower impact.  
2.1.3–Incentives to obtain best financing conditions 
Accounting research displays evidence that accounting information plays a 
major role in debt agreements, indirectly affecting the underlying interest rates(e.g. 
Asquith et al., 2005). According toAkerlof(1970), companies tend to manage earnings 
upwards in an attempt not to violate the accomplishment of contracts, thus 
avoidingincreases in their financing cost3. In the case of Portuguese Small and 
Medium-Sized Enterprises (SME), which depend on the bank system to obtain funds, 
the financial information that theyuse to support their financing requests not only can 
have an effect on the cost of such a financing butis also a basic condition to access it. 
In order to reduce the information asymmetry, and the effect of earnings management, 
financial institutions tend to support their decisions also in qualitative and 
complementary information like, for example, the quality of their management(e.g. 
Epps & Ismail, 2009). 
Good corporate governance mechanisms tend to constrain fraud and earnings 
management attitudes, thusaffecting positively the level of financing costs.In the case 
of unlisted companies of small size, the agency problems will be lower or nonexistent, 
since the manager tends to be the owner. Thosehaving an earnings management 
incentive to obtain the best financing conditions tend to manage earningsupwards - or 
constrainmanipulation in the downward direction-, in order to better signal the quality of 
the company. The evidence in Moreira (2007)supports this intuition, and Huyghebaert 
et al. (2007)found similar evidence, for a set of Belgium start-ups, showing that such 
companies managed earnings upwards in the years previous to their first loan request 
to financial institutions. 
Giving the evidence discussed in this and in the previous 
subsections,oneconcludes that the tax incentive and the incentive to optimize financing 
conditions push companies to undertake earnings management actions, and in the limit 
accounting and tax fraud.  
 
2.2-Methods of earnings manipulation and money laundering 
Earnings manipulation methodscan be classified into three groups: those based 
on the ability and flexibility of accounting choice; those based on the use of real 
earnings management activities; and those concerning the fraudulent manipulation of 
financial information or corporate transactions. 
On concerning the first group, the manipulation tends to occur in the domain of 
the accounting estimates, likewise depreciations, provisions, impairments. These 
practices tend to be more common in Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. Bowen et al., 1995; 
Christie & Zimmerman, 1994), because of the milder impact of tax rules on companies 
accounting decisions. Portuguese accounting standardshave such flexibilitybutit tends 
not to be much used for the purpose of manipulation, because companies use mainly 
fiscal rules in making their accounting choices. For example, they use the maximum 
rates of depreciation allowed for tax purposes, instead of the economic ones; or the 
percentage of losses for bad debts impairments allowed by the Corporate Tax Law. 
                                                            
3As refer Dechow et al. (1996), this goal cannot be achieved if the manipulation is made public. 
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On concerningreal practices of earnings management, the available evidence 
suggests that managers do temporaryreductions inthe sales price to increase the 
turnover, and discretionarily minimize expenses to increase disclosed margins 
(Roychowdhury, 2006). Other practices adopted include, for example, the increase of 
sales at the end of the period, accepting its return by customers in the beginning of the 
next(Penman, 2008). Both cases are situations that fall into the gray area that divides 
earningsmanagementfrom the mere business management, although thelatter case 
could even be considered as fraudulent. 
In terms of fraudulent manipulation the solutions are more diverse and less 
easy to assemble in well-defined groups. Theinvoiceless of sales, discussed in the 
current paper, is one of the methods used for earnings reduction and tax evasion. The 
literature seldom discusses this type of manipulation(DeFond, 2010), due to the 
difficulty to systematize how itis practiced, and also of detecting and measuring 
itempirically. Nevertheless, there are studies that provide empirical evidence on the 
existence of fraud in financial statements(e.g. Kaminski et al., 2004; Persons, 
1995;Skousen et al., 2009). 
There is a link between accounting fraud and money laundering, and 
accounting professionals can play very important rolls in drawing it(e.g. Compin, 
2008;Sikka & Hampton, 2005). For Mitchell et al. (1998), accountants and auditors may 
use their expertise to create complex webs of transactions with the purpose of 
“cleaning” illicit funds. According to Masciandaro(1999), money laundering has two 
key-characteristics: illegality, that implies the use of revenues originated illegally or in 
criminal activities, or revenues that haven’t been reported to the tax authority (Sarigul, 
2013); and concealment, because the first goal of money laundering is to hide the 
illegal source of such revenues. 
Shareholders loans related to invoiceless sales fit Masciandaro(1999)definition. 
They use illegal money, that haven’t been reported for tax purposes, and conceal the 
origin of the funds, taking advantage of existing soft bank and tax rules. Moreover, as 
mentioned previously, such loans were more than the adoption of a mere money 
laundering technique, because they were a basic way of keeping solvable companies 
making invoiceless sales.  
Shareholders loans can thus be seen as a technique adding to the common 
lists of methods and techniques for money laundering (e.g. Quirk, 1997; Sarigul, 2013), 
where the most common is smurfing, i.e. the use of multiple cash deposits in multiple 
bank accounts for amounts below the minimum cash reporting requirement. 
2.3- Economic, institutional and social Portuguese context 
As previously mentioned, the incentives to undertakeearnings management 
seem to be closely related to the economic, institutional and social context in which the 
firmsare embedded. This justifies a brief summary of the main factors that characterize 
thePortuguesecase. Fourmain characteristics (Moreira, 2007): i) a strong alignment 
between ownership and management, which means that most companies are 
managed by their owners and thus there are no related agency conflicts; ii) business 
financing is obtained essentially through banks; iii) the current legal system is of code-
law type, in the sense that it is described by Ball et al. (2000),and there is a very close 
relationship between the accounting and tax systems; iv)the “tax morale” (Richardson, 
2006) tends to be low, i.e. the moral principles or values individuals hold about paying 
taxes tend to be weak, mainly because citizens do not have a good relationship with 
the State. This explains, at least partly, the high level of Portuguese tax evasion. 
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Companies in Portugal are generally SME, wherein, in addition to being 
managed by the owners, their corporate structure is mostly familiar. This implies that 
the company’s interests match exactly those of the manager/shareholder, justifying that 
one of the earnings management main incentives is the minimization of corporate 
taxes, conditional on the need to obtain bankfinancing. 
The academic and financial qualificationsof SME entrepreneurs/managers tend 
to be low, and they tend not to use accounting as a management tool. Therefore, the 
main function of these companies’ accounting is to fulfill a legal request and to support 
the estimation of the income tax. This specific context explains why companies 
financial reporting tends to be based on fiscal rather thanon economic criteria. 
 
3- Discussion of the research hypothesis 
Let’s remind that the aim of this study is todiscuss whetherthere is an empirical 
connection in between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books 
and the invoiceless sales they make, i.e. that such loans are a vehicle adopted by 
some companies for “laundering” the proceeds of this fraud. 
Anecdotal evidence of companies’ daily life, and of known results of upward tax 
corrections applied by the PTA, allow expectingthat accounting and tax fraud occurs, at 
least partly, through invoiceless sales. It is also informally known that companies tend 
to acquire in the formal circuit, and record in their books,the inputs underlying 
invoiceless sales, implying that their costs will not suffer the same downward impact as 
their revenues, making the gross margin decline. Earnings are negatively affected, as 
intended, and companies’ treasurywill suffer the grip resulting from the asymmetric 
evolution of costs and receipts. It will be difficult for the company to ensure payments to 
suppliers and other creditors unless the proceeds of invoiceless salesare reintroduced 
in the treasury. In such a context, shareholders loans are adopted as a vehicle that has 
the double purpose of “laundering” those proceeds, reintroducing them in the formal 
economy, and keep the company financially solvable. 
Thus, in sum, this fraud process hastwo main consequences. Firstly, there is a 
negative impact on companies’ recordedturnover, and on the gross margin because 
they tend to record in their accounting all purchased inputs.Secondly, the treasury is 
negatively affected, constraining companies in solving timely their financial 
commitments, unless the proceeds of the invoiceless sales are “laundered” and enter 
companies’ accounting books. This is expected to be accomplished through 
shareholders loans. 
This general intuitionis synthesized in the following hypothesis: 
H1- Shareholders loans increases arerelated to accounting and tax fraud 
through invoiceless sales. 
The next subsection introduces the methodology and statistical sample adopted 
to test this hypothesis. 
 
4- Methodology and sample selection  
4.1-The use of a control subsample  
The current research aims to test whethershareholders loans increasesare 
positively related to invoiceless sales. To this end, two subsamples were created: 
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onecomposed of companies with positive changes (increases) in thoseloans; another, 
deemed as acontrol sample, gatheringcompanies with negative changes. These 
subsamples were built in a way that each company of the control subsample finds a 
pair in the first one in terms of size, year and industry. For companies’ size purpose we 
adopted the natural logarithm of total assets. The industries were defined as a two-digit 
code of the Portuguese industry classification (v.3).4 
4.2–Classification of invoiceless sales companies 
As previously explained, it is expected that invoiceless sales influence 
negatively the gross margin5, because the salesrecorded arelower than actual sales 
and at least a part of the inputs underlying the invoiceless sales tend to be recorded in 
the books. This asymmetric movementimplies two consequences: the COGSincrease 
relatively to the volume of invoiced sales;the CFO deteriorates beyond the effect of the 
invoiceless sales. 
The assumption that the cost of all inputs tends to be recorded as a cost, 
regardless of the sales invoicing nature,is based on anecdotal concrete evidence. It 
permits us to classify the companies regarding their invoiceless sales behavior based 
on two models available in the literature to detect earnings management through real 
activities(e.g. Cohen et al., 2008; Ge & Kim, 2014; Gunny, 2010; Roychowdhury, 
2006).  
The first model, adaptedfrom Roychowdhury(2006) and Cohen et al. 
(2008),allows the estimation of the normal level of COGSbased on companies’ 
revenue: 
                                                        (1) 
where,  
 COGSt- Cost of goods soldof year t 
 REVt - Revenues of year t; 
 TAt-1 - Total assets at the end of year t-1; 
 ξt–The model residuals. 
Because the intercept ” absorbs the average effect of the uncorrelated 
omitted variables of the model, in this particular case at least the control for the impact 
of invoiceless sales on the COGS, it is expect that coefficient to be higher for firms 
havinginvoiceless sales (YIS) than for firms withno invoiceless sales (NIS). As 
suggested by Moreira (2006), when the model is estimated cross-sectionally by 
industry with no control forinvoiceless sales, one may expect that the size of the 
intercept will lie somewhere in between the extreme cases characterised by having 
only one type of sales (NIS or YIS). Let us call it the “average intercept” . Given 
the higher impact of REV on COGS for invoiceless sales companies, it is expected that 
this intercept is understated for YIS firms, and overstated for NIS firms, i.e. 
.The consequence is the existence of a measurement error 
(ERR) that translates into theestimation of and is defined as 
. It follows the following expectation: and 
. 
                                                            
4The Portuguese IndustryClassification v.3 iscloselylinked to the NACE - 
StatisticalClassificationofEconomicActivities in theEuropeanCommunity v.2. 
5The “gross profit margin”, or simply the “gross margin”, is defined as the revenue (sales + services) 
minus the cost of goods sold and consumed. 
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The second model, adapted from Ge and Kim (2014), is used to estimate the 
normal level CFO(Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006):  
                       (2) 
whereCFOtis the cash flows from operations and ∆REVt is the change in revenues, 
bothinyeart. The other variables are defined as per equation (1).6 
To discuss the impact of invoiceless sales on the estimation of CFO we adopt a 
deductive reasoning similar to the one used in model (1). For a given amount of 
recorded revenue, the impact on CFO of the cost of the inputs underlying the sales 
tends to be higher for YIS than for NIS companies. This means that it is expected the 
CFO will be smaller for acompanyclassified as a YIS, because the cost of the inputs 
that impact CFO is higher than for a NIScompany, given that such a cost is expected to 
be related to an amount of sales higher than that recorded in the books. This implies 
that the “average intercept” is expected to follow this hierarchy: 
. Defining , then it is expected that: 
and . 
Based on the above models, and on the economic intuitionunderlying each of 
them, wedefine a variableto classify fraudster companies based on the methodology 
proposed by Gunny (2010), the“invoiceless salescompanies” variable (ISC). 
Companies having an estimated ERR2 less than or equal to the 1st quartile of 
the distribution of such measurement errors, i.e. that have CFOquite below the normal 
expectation, are more likely to have undertook invoiceless sales. The same is true for 
companies that have an estimated ERR1 greater than or equal to the 3rd quartile of the 
distribution of this type of measurement error, i.e. havingCOGS above the normal 
expectation. Thus, companies that most likely madeinvoiceless sales are those that fill 
simultaneously both conditions. 
According to Gunny (2010), there is a simple way of combining both criteria and 
define a unique classifying variable. Firstly, both error variables distributions are sorted 
in ascending or descending order. Secondly, the distribution of one of these variables 
is multiplied by minus one, in order to get its symmetric. We have chosen the ERR1 
variable, and named it SERR1. Thirdly,each observation ofSERR1is summed with its 
counterpart in the ERR2 sorted distribution, creating the variableΣERR. In this new 
distribution companies that most likely madeinvoiceless sales are those with the lowest 
ΣERR values. Thus, finally, the ISC variable is defined as a dummy variable that takes 
value 1 if the value of ΣERRfor particular observation is less than or equal to the 1st 
quartile of its distribution, 0 otherwise. 
 
4.3- The model 
The aim of the current research is to test whether shareholders loansare related 
to accounting and tax fraud by invoiceless sales.As the working hypothesis states, 
wepredict a positive relationship between increases of such debts and the existence of 
this type of manipulation.The global model, estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS), is the following: 
                                                            
6The models (1) and (2) are estimated cross-sectionally by year and industry whenever this has 
at least 15 observations (Roychowdhury, 2006) in the sample-base defined in subsection 4.4 
above.  
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                                                (3) 
The dependent variable of the model is the change in shareholders loans 
(∆LOA), using ISCas the main variable that qualifies companies as fraudster 
byinvoiceless sales. The other arecontrol variables. The complete set of variables is 
defined as follows: 
∆LOAit - Changes in shareholders loans of companyi and yeart, deflated by lagged total 
assets; 
ISCit– Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if companyi in yeart is classified as a 
fraudster byinvoicelesssales, 0 otherwise. Given the above discussion, we 
expect its coefficient to be positive; 
Dit - Dummy variable that characterizes the sign of the change in shareholders loans, 
taking value 1 if the observation belongs to the subsample of companies with 
∆LOA>0, 0 if the observation belongs to the subsample of companies with 
∆LOA< 0; 
D*ISCit - Interactive variable defined as the product of variables D and ISC, intended to 
control for potential differences in companies behavior towards 
invoicelesssales. Its coefficient is predicted to be positive; 
∆WCit - Change in working capital ofcompanyi in yeart deflated by lagged total assets. 
Given that shareholders loans can be used to increase companies working 
capital, we predict its coefficient to be positive; 
∆FIXAit - Changeof fixed assetsofcompanyi in yeart, deflated by lagged total assets. 
Since one of the potential uses of shareholders loans is the acquisition of fixed 
assets, we predict its coefficient to be positive; 
∆DCIit - Changes of debts to financial institutions ofcompanyi in yeart, deflated by 
lagged total assets. This variable intends to control whether the use of 
shareholders loans and the bank loans are substitutes. We expect its coefficient 
to be negative; 
SIZEit - Size of companyi in yeart, proxied by total assets natural logarithm. It is 
assumed that small companies are more likely tomakeinvoiceless transactions, 
and thus we predict its coefficient to be negative; 
AUDITit - Dummy variable that controls forthe existence of an auditor in yeart, a way of 
constraining the occurrence of invoicelesssales and thus the use of 
shareholders loans. It takes 1 if there is an auditor, 0 otherwise, and the 
expected sign of its coefficient is negative; 
LFit - Dummy variable taking value 1 if the legal structure of the company is a limited 
company, 0 if it is a limited liability partnership. It is assumed that the use of 
shareholders loans arising from invoicelesssales is easierfor the latter given 
their smaller number of partnersthat makes less difficult to get an agreement on 
such a matter. Thus, it is expected its coefficient to be negative; 
IMPEXPit - Dummy variable taking value 1 if the company has import/export activity, 0 
otherwise. Due to existence of control procedures and extra documentation, it is 
assumed that companies with this type ofactivity may have additional difficulties 
to makeinvoicelesssales, and therefore to have related shareholders loans. 
Thus, it is expected its coefficient to be negative; 
SUBit - Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the company is deemed as an affiliate/ 
subsidiary of another company, 0 otherwise. In affiliates/subsidiary companies 
shareholders loans can be the visible effect of the financial relations in the 
group. Thus, we predict its coefficient to be positive; 
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 - Set of dummy variables that take value 1 if the observation belongs to 
a particular industryn, 0 otherwise. We do not issueaprediction about the sign of 
these variables; 
 - Set of dummy variables that take value 1 if the observation 
belongs to yeart, 0 otherwise. Also in this case we do not issue a prediction about the 
sign of their coefficients; 
εit. - Estimation error which complies with the classical assumptions of the models 
estimated by OLS. 
 
The continuous variables are deflated by lagged total assets. This procedure is 
intended to circumventheteroscedasticity problems(e.g. García-Teruel et al., 2009; 
Jones, 1991). 
 
4.4- Selection of the sample and descriptive statistics7 
The sample includes limited companies (hereafter LTD)and limited liability 
partnerships (hereafter LLP) available in the Iberian Balance Sheet Analysis System 
(SABI), database of Bureau van Dijk,with data for the years 1998-2007.8 As already 
discussed, the global sample is composed of two subsamples and each of 
themmatches the other by size, year and industry. The main difference in betweenthem 
lies on the sign of the change in shareholders loans. 
Table 1 describes the sample selection. Listed, financial and companies 
belonging to the public sector were deleted in the selection process because they are 
expected to have distinct incentivesand freedom to makeinvoiceless sales(e.g. 
Coppens & Peek, 2005). 
Table 1-Sample selection 
Description N. Obs.
SABI data base (2009). The number of companies and partnerships 
reachs28814, for the period 1998-2007 288140
After removal of listed, financial sector, and public sector companies 243072
After deletion of missing data and lagging of variables. 102181
After imposing a minimum of 15 observations per industry and year 101389
After elimination of observations with ∆LOA null or missing, and 
outliers (1% +1%) of this and other variables 8416
After the matching process, observations in each subsample 2327
Global sample 4654
 
To estimate models (1) and (2) we eliminated all industries with less than 15 
observations per year (e.g. Roychowdhury, 2006). To estimate model (3), we 
considered only observations with ∆LOA positive or negative. After deletion of outliers 
(1% +1%) for variables ∆LOA, ∆WC, ∆FIXAand ∆DCI, by year and industry, the 
number of observations reduced to 8416. This was the basis to define two (mirrored) 
subsamples having 2327 observations each.  
                                                            
7All statistical treatment is carried out using the Statistical Analysis System (SAS) software. 
8Since 2007 changes in thetax rules circumventenormouslycompanies’ windowofopportunity to 
use shareholdersloans as a moneylaunderingtechnique. 
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After regressing models (1) and (2), basic descriptive statistics were estimated 
in order to describe the subsamples. Table 2-Panel A displays such statistics. 
 
 
 
Table 2-Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Characterization of the subsamples 
 Mean Median 
Variables ∆LOA>0 ∆LOA<0 Pr>|t| ∆LOA>0 ∆LOA<0 Pr>|Z|
Abnormal CFO -0.241 -0.168 0.107 -0.027 0.008 0.000
Abnormal COGS 0.021 0.015 0.784 0.029 0.017 0.006
Returnonassets 0.025 0.041 0.000 0.029 0.036 0.000
Financial leverage 0.227 0.288 0.000 0.228 0.274 0.000
Loans/Liabilities 0.221 0.159 0.000 0.150 0.086 0.000
Bankloans/Liabilities 0.250 0.270 0.001 0.217 0.236 0.013
Assetturnover 1.292 1.373 0.036 1.002 1.093 0.000
Notes:  
1) "Abnormal COGS" are the residuals of model (1), also labeled ERR1, and 
“abnormal CFO” are the residuals of model (2),ERR2. ”Return on Assets”is the 
ratio of operating earningsto total assets.“Financial leverage”is the ratio of 
equity to total assets. “Assetturnover” is the ratio of total revenuesto total 
assets.∆LOA>0 (∆LOA<0 )is the subsample of companies with positive 
(negative)change in loans. 
2) Pr>|t| (Pr>|Z |)is the level of significance for the difference of means (medians) 
in between subsamples [t-Test (Wilcoxon Test)]; 
3) The number of observations per subsample is 2327. 
 
The table shows that the value of the statistics for the ∆LOA>0 subsample are 
consistently and significantly lower, for the mean and median, with the exception of 
abnormal COGS and the ratioLoans/Liabilities for the mean.As expected, althoughthe 
difference is significant only at the median level, abnormal CFO that proxies 
forinvoicelesssalesis negative and lower in companies with ∆LOA>0 (-0.241 vs. -
0.168), as discussed in subsection 4.2.Another sign of this behavior is the 
abnormalCOGSthat is positive and higher for companies in the ∆LOA>0 subsample, 
also consistent with the previous discussion, although the difference to ∆LOA<0 is 
statistically significant only at median level. Thus, ∆LOA>0 companies show lowerCFO 
than should record (justifying the negative sign) and higher COGS than it would be 
normal given the actual sales volume. This evidence is in line with the expectations 
underlying the research hypothesis (H1). 
Since the subsamples are mirrored by size, industry and year, as already 
mentioned, the difference for the return on assetsseems to be the outcome of lower 
sales volume and lower gross margin recordedby ∆LOA>0 companies. This evidence 
and potential explanation is also consistent with the expectation underlying the 
research hypothesis (H1), which assumes that ∆LOA>0companies manage earnings 
downwards by makinginvoicelesssales, and record the cost of the inputs underlying 
such sales, thus increasing the COGS. This predicted behavior for ∆LOA>0 companies 
may also explain their lower financial leverage (Equity/Total assets), given the impact 
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that invoicelesssales have on the financial structure, deteriorating it over time. 
Moreover, a low financial leverage makes more difficult to get bank funding and puts 
pressure on shareholders to lend money to these companies. 
 
 
Panel B: Analysis of the model (3) variables by subsample 
 Mean Median 
Variables ∆LOA>0 ∆LOA<0 Pr>|t| ∆LOA>0 ∆LOA<0 Pr>|Z| 
∆LOA 0.055 -0.046 0.000 0.024 -0.019 0.000 
∆WC 0.052 0.022 0.000 0.028 0.009 0.000 
∆FIXA 0.034 0.047 0.619 -0.001 -0.005 0.000 
∆DCI 0.020 0.047 0.046 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SIZE 15.055 15.065 0.763 14.923 14.944 0.817 
Notes:  
1) Variables definition: ∆LOA- Change in loans; ∆WC- Change in working capital; 
∆FIXA- Change in fixed assets; ∆DCI-Changein debt to financial institutions, all 
the previous variables deflated by lagged total assets.SIZE-Companysize 
defined as the natural logarithm oftotal assets; 
2) Pr>|t| (Pr>|Z |)is the level of significance for the difference of means (medians) 
in between the subsamples [t-Test (Wilcoxon Test)]; 
3) The proportion of LLP companies in the subsamples is 65.5% (63.9%) for 
∆LOA>0 (∆LOA<0). The weight of companies with audited accounts is 44% in 
both subsamples. Companies classified as IMP/EXP are 44% (45.2%) for 
subsample∆LOA>0 (∆LOA<0). The proportion of companies that are 
subsidiaries of other companies is approximately 2% in both subsamples. 
Therefore, the subsamples are balanced concerning these variables. 
4) The number of observations per subsample is 2327. 
 
The statistics displayed in Table 2- Panel B tend to be consistent with our 
expectations, and for most variables the subsamples show significant differences. Also 
as expected, undisclosed evidence shows that the percentage of observations 
classified as belonging to invoicelesssales companies (variable ISCtakes value 1) is 
larger in subsample ∆LOA>0 (30.08%) than in subsample ∆LOA<0 (21.66%). 
In the next subsection we discuss the empirical results of model (3). 
5- Empirical results 
In the previous subsections we discussed the research hypothesis (H1), the 
model (3) to test it, and the data. Now we analysethe empirical evidence available from 
its estimation. 
5.1- Relation of shareholders loans with invoiceless transactions fraud 
Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients. We remind that the main objective 
of the test is to check whether the increase in shareholders loans is related to the 
invoicelesssales. 
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Table 3- Change in shareholdersloans andinvoiceless transactions 
IndependentVariables Expected Sign   
Coefficient 
(P-value) 
P-
Value 
∆LOA>0 0.027 (0.000) 
ISC + 
S
ub
sa
m
pl
e 
∆LOA<0 0.002 (0.698) 
∆WC +   0.047 (0.000) 
∆FIXA +   0.059 (0.000) 
∆DCI -   -0.128 (0.000) 
SIZE -   0.000 (0.855) 
AUDIT -   0.000 (0.935) 
LF -   0.007 (0.134) 
IMPEXP -   0.000 (0.961) 
SUB +   0.024 (0.004) 
R2 (%)   33.25 
AJUST. R2(%)     32.35 
 
Notes: 
1) Variables definition: ISC - dummy variable that takes value 1 if the companyis 
classified as fraudster byinvoiceless transactions, 0 otherwise;AUDIT - dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the company report is audited, 0 otherwise; LF- 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if the legal structure is a limited company, 0 
if it is a limited liability partnership; IMPEXP- dummy variable that takes value 1 
if the company has importing/exporting activity, 0 otherwise;SUB-dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if the company is deemed an affiliate/ subsidiary of 
another company, 0 otherwise. The remaining variables are as per Table2- 
Painel B; 
2) The model was regressed with a set of control variables for year and industry. 
For the sake of parsimony their coefficients were not displayed. Observations 
per subsample, 2327. 
 
The model is globally significant and its explanatory power has an Adjusted R2of 
32.35%. The coefficients of the variables tend to show the expected sign, and the 
relationship between the increase in shareholders loans and the variable that classifies 
companies as fraudster by invoicelesssales (ISC) is positive and significantfor the 
subsample ∆LOA>0 (0.027), and is not significant for the subsample∆LOA<0 (0.002). 
This evidence supports hypothesis H1, showing that such a relation exists and is 
significant at the conventional degree of statistical confidence.9 
The positive and significant coefficient of ∆FIXAsuggests that a part of the 
increase in shareholders loans may be motivated by the need to finance fixed assets 
investment. However, even after controlling for this effect, and for a similar effect on the 
                                                            
9The multiplicative variable D*ISC allows to test whether the relation is the same for both 
subsamples.   The aggregate coefficient for the ∆LOA<0 subsample is given by the coefficient 
of ISC, and for ∆LOA>0 by the sum of coefficients ISC+ D*ISC. 
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change in working capital (∆WC),the coefficient onISC is significant. This means that at 
least partly shareholders loans are related to invoicelesssales. In the next subsection 
we will return to this relationship. 
Unexpectedly, the AUDIT variable shows a no significant coefficient, suggesting 
that auditors are unable to control the deep source of (at least part of) shareholders 
loans. A potential explanation for this result may be the fact that auditors’ role is not to 
control the existence of fraud, rather to assure companies’ compliance with accounting 
standards. On concerning the change in debt to financial institutions (∆DCI), the 
coefficient is as expected and suggests that shareholders loans may act as a substitute 
for bank loans. 
The variable SIZEunexpectedly shows a no significant coefficient, suggesting 
that shareholders loans are not driven by company size. Contrastingly, shareholders 
loans in companies that have a group relationship (SUB) are at least partly driven by 
such group connections. Companies’ legal structure (LF) and the IMP/EXP activity 
(IMPEXP) do not seem to affect shareholders loans, showing not significant 
coefficients. 
Table 4 displays additional evidence that give extra support to our hypothesis, 
displaying a set of positive and significant coefficients for the IND control variables. 
Among the 46 industries controlled in the analysis, only 7 (15.22%) shows this type of 
coefficient. Most of these industries were often mentioned in the media asbeing 
fraudster by invoicelesssales. 
Thus, the collected evidence suggests that at least a part of shareholders loans 
is related to fraud activity. This relationship occurs even after controlling for various 
determinants that may affect the existence of positive changes in shareholders loans.  
Table 4- Coefficients of dummy variables that identify industries 
IND Description Coefficient (P-value)
1 Agriculture, animal production, huntingandrelated serviceactivities 0.032 (0.015) 
18 Printing and reproductionof media 0.048 (0.003) 
26 Manufacturing equipment, communications equipment, and electronic and optical products 0.077 (0.010) 
38 Collection, treatment anddisposal activities;materials recovery 0.036 (0.097) 
42 Civil engineering 0.027 (0.031) 
55 Accommodation 0.042 (0.001) 
56 Restaurantsand similar 0.033 (0.072) 
Notes:IND - Two-digit codes of the Portuguese industry classification (CAE v.3); this 
Tabledisplays only the positive and statistically significant (at less than 10%) 
coefficients. 
 
In the next subsection we develop some robustness tests in order to assess the 
strength of the results discussed so far. 
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5.2- Robustnesstests 
Additional tests were performed. The first one tested two aspects already 
discussed above:the relationship between changesinshareholders loans and changesin 
the investment in fixed assets; the possibility of changes in shareholders loans being 
mere loans between the mother company and its subsidiaries.  
Using the previous methodology, we began by subtracting to the positive 
change in shareholders loans the positive changes in fixed asset, neutralizing this way 
the impact of investment. Then we eliminatedfrom the samples companies classified as 
subsidiaries of other companies, implying to remove larger companies where 
shareholders loans may not be related to invoicelesssales.Given these adjustments, 
variablesFIXA and ∆SUBwere removed from the original model. The results are 
displayed in Table 5. 
Table 5-Changes in shareholdersloansafter controlling for fixed assets 
investment and group relations 
IndependentVariables ExpectedSign   
Coefficient 
(P-value) 
P-
Value 
∆LOA>0 0.025 (0.000) 
ISC + 
S
ub
sa
m
pl
e 
∆LOA<0 0.004 (0.428) 
∆WC +   0.006 (0.269) 
∆DCI -   -0.025 (0.000) 
SIZE -   0.000 (0.814) 
AUDIT -   0.008 (0.167) 
LF -   -0.001 (0.855) 
IMPEXP -   0.001 (0.867) 
R2 (%)    33.99  
AJUST. R2 (%)      32.93  
 
Notes:The variables definition isas perTable 2-Panel B and Table 3. Each subsample 
has 1850 obs. 
 
The evidence in this table is qualitatively similar to that in Table 3. Thus, after 
having controlled for the effect of positive changes in fixed asset and group relations, 
the evidence still supports the intuition underlying the research hypothesis: changes in 
shareholders loans are related to fraud by invoicelesssales. 
Other tests were performed:i) the modelwas regressed forlimited companies 
only, and the results were qualitatively the same as before; ii) the model was regressed 
for subsidiaries only, and in this case the relationship ceases to exist, suggesting that 
for these companies shareholders loans are not significantly related to 
invoicelesssales. A potential reason for this resultmay be the size ofcompanies 
belonging to groups that could constrain somehow invoicelesssales fraud; iii) based on 
the evidence in Table 2– Panel A, we also controlled for companies profitability in order 
to assess whether it is related to fraud behavior. Companies were divided into two 
groups based on their profitability: the more and the less profitable. The evidence 
shows that such behavior is related to changes in shareholders loans in both groups, 
discharging the idea that such loanscould occur only on less profitable companies as a 
way shareholdersused toovercome theimpact on the cash flowarising from lack of 
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profitability; iv) we then controlled for the type of industry,in order to assess whether 
companies behavior is homogeneous across industries. The model was regressed only 
for a set of industries that were expected not to make invoiceless sales10, and the 
ISCcoefficient for the subsample ∆LOA>0was no longer statistically significant, and the 
relation to shareholders loans had disappeared. Thisevidence adds robustness to our 
results, and shows that the characteristics of the industry on concerning 
invoicelesssales is a key factor in explaining shareholders loans; v) we adopted 
different dependent variables, by adding to these loans, one at a time, equity increases 
and other changes in equity. The overall evidence is qualitatively similar to the one 
discussed above; vi) we also controlled for the nature of companies’ activity (industrial, 
commercial or service). Also in this case, the results are robust and supportive of our 
hypothesis. 
In summary, the empirical evidence collected in these tests supports the 
findings discussed in the previous subsection, i.e. it supports the hypothesis that 
companiesmaking alleged invoicelesssales fraud useshareholders loans as a vehicle to 
introduce in their treasury themoney that were generated in the informal economy. 
 
6- Conclusion 
The currentstudy testedwhether there was an empirical and positive relation 
between shareholders loans increases recorded in companies’ books and the 
invoiceless sales they made, i.e. whether such loans were a vehicle adopted for 
“laundering” the proceeds of this fraud. 
The existence of a particular context, a temporary window of opportunity, made 
possible the design of the research in a way that avoids the access to privileged 
corporate information. The study adopted a relatively simple three-step methodology. 
Firstly, two subsamples of companies are assembled, one composed of companies 
with shareholders loans increases; the other, the control sample, companies with loans 
decreases. The global sample is the sum of the two subsamples and composed of 
pairs of firms belonging to the same industry and year, and having identical size, but 
differentiating in the sign of the change in shareholders loans. Secondly, based on the 
traces invoiceless sales leave in the accounting numbers companies are classified 
according their fraud behavior, into groups of “fraudster” and “non fraudster”, based on 
predictions of their abnormal cash flow from operations and cost of goods sold.Thirdly, 
a model is built and regressed to test the relationship between companies’ fraud 
behavior underlying invoiceless sales and the sign of shareholders loans change. 
The empirical evidence supports the ex-ante expectation of a positive 
relationship between shareholders loans increases and accounting and tax fraud 
through invoiceless sales. The evidence suggests that at least a part of those loans is 
related to this fraud, and they are the vehicle for ”laundering” the proceeds of informal 
transactions and, simultaneously, for keeping financially solvable the involved 
companies. 
The current study makes four main contributions to the literature. Firstly, it 
brings a novel perspective to the accounting and tax fraud scarce literature (e.g. 
DeFond, 2010), highlighting an economic and corporate context of under-invoicing 
sales, in the limit invoiceless sales, that is not the usual context related to imports and 
                                                            
10Two-digit codes of industry classification (CAE v.3): 27 - Manufacture of electrical equipment; 
28 - Manufacture of machinery and equipment; 35 - Electricity, gas, steam, hot and cold water 
and cold air; 36 - Collection, purification and distribution of water; 51 - Air transport; 53 - Postal 
and courier activities; 61 – Telecommunications; and 92 - Lotteries and other betting games. 
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exports activities and the attached use of transfer prices (e.g. Biswas & Marjit, 2005; 
Patnaik & Vasudevan, 2000). Secondly, it shows that in the particular context 
described in the paper shareholders loans are used as a way of “laundering” the 
proceeds of invoiceless sales, serving simultaneously to keep companies solvable. 
This double purpose of the technique usage is in itself also a novelty in the literature, 
contributing for a better perception of what can be in this particular context the 
determinants underlying the choice of the vehicles to reintroduce illicit money in the 
formal economy. Thirdly, adopting a design and research tools borrowed from the 
earnings management literature to study a fraud problem, our paper also brings a 
contribution by relating somewhat that literature to the one on fraud (e.g. DeFond, 
2010). Fourthly, based on a sample of southern European unlisted companies, our 
study also makes a contribution to the yet scarce literature on these firms, namely in 
the way tax evasion evolves in this region (e.g. Richardson, 2006).  
This study is of particular interest for the Portuguese Tax Authority, because of 
the contribution it makes to a better understanding of Portuguese business reality and 
the relation between companies, buyers and that Authority. However, its interest is 
geographically broader because it may be helpful for similar authorities in other 
countries facing similar challenges in copping with tax evasion and “money laundering”. 
Nevertheless, the current research is not exempt of limitations. The most 
prominent is the way companies are classified as fraudster by invoiceless sales. 
Although the economic intuition is strong and there is anecdotal evidence on the issue, 
we recognizethere is space for using newand more elaborated proxies to do such 
classification. This is left as a path for future research. 
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